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AbstractNowadays, the complexity of high speed civil transport and highly-augmented rotorcraft, has led toan increase in the chances of encountering unwanted unstable phenomena, such as the so calledAircraft/Rotorcraft-Pilot Couplings (A/RPCs) or Pilot-Induced Oscillations (PIOs), whose unpredictability hasgiven rise to a serious problem concerning the safety of a mission. When talking about PIOs, McRuer de-ﬁned them as “inadvertent, sustained aircraft oscillations which are a consequence of an abnormal jointenterprise between the aircraft and the pilot”. However, A/RPCs, these undesirable events associated withthe interaction between pilot and aircraft, have become diverse andmore complex than those encounteredin the past. At the moment, there are different methods available to prevent and detect Cat. I/II A/RPC, butparticular interest has recently arisen in this topic for ﬂight simulation applications as any enhancementof these tools in order to accurately and objectively predict, detect (in real-time) and alleviate RPCs will begreatly welcomed. One of the main questions to be answered through the efforts carried out within thiswork is related to the better detection in real-time of embedded tendencies to RPCs in modern aircraft. Toanswer this question, initially an assessment of the eﬃcacy of the Phase-Aggression Criterion (PAC), whichhas been designed a few years ago at the University of Liverpool, will be undertaken either: as a meansof alerting the pilot to conditions likely to lead to the onset of a PIO; or, given that the time available forthe pilot to counteract may be extremely limited, as a means to assist him/her in alleviating (automatically)the PIO condition itself. Preliminary results from ﬂight simulation trials to explore how best to achieve thiswill be reported. Moreover, this work will report on the development of PAC boundaries for more highlyaugmented response types. Furthermore, as classiﬁed by McRuer, Cat. III PIO, which is nonlinear in essence,is the most complex one. However, the researches on Cat. III PIO are rare. This paper will reveal some ele-mentary results of Cat. III PIO. Since there is no existing method used for predicting and detecting Cat. IIIPIO, this paper utilized the characteristics of PIO, such as the amplitude, the oscillation frequency and ul-timate tendency of key aircraft response states to judge Cat. III PIO preliminarily. By using this elementaryjudgment of PIO, we studied the following factors: time delay of pilot input and helicopter main body, actu-ator position saturation, actuator rate limit and SCAS control authority in triggering PIO. Results show thatPIO induced by actuator position saturation, actuator rate limit and SCAS control authority can be regardedas Cat. III PIO as the variation of these factors can be viewed as a kind of transition of effective controlledvehicle dynamics. These kinds of transition can cause a mismatch between the effective controlled vehicledynamics and pilot control strategy, which is the main cause of Cat. III PIO.
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NOMENCLATURE
AG Aggression, deg/s2
Hs Control Gearing, deg/s/in (for RC)- deg/in (for ACAH)
TpPK1 Time of last roll peak rate, s
TqPK1 Time of last pitch peak rate, s
TδPK1 Time of last control peak, s
TpPK2 Time of current roll peak rate, s
TqPK2 Time of current pitch peak rate, s
TδPK2 Time of current control peak, s
t Time, s
Φ Phase Distortion, deg
δΘ1c Lateral Pilot Control Input, in
δΘ1s Longitudinal Pilot Control Input, deg
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Θ1c Lateral Swashplate Deﬂection, deg
Θ1s Longitudinal Swashplate Deﬂection, deg
τp Time Delay, s
θ Pitch Angle, rad
φ Roll Angle, rad
q Pitch Rate, rad/s
p Roll Rate, rad/s
V Forward Speed, m/s
H Altitude, m
u Forward Speed along X-axis of Body Frame, m/s
w Forward Speed along Z-axis of Body Frame, m/s
Subscripts
ol Open Loop
cl Closed Loop
p Pilot
PK1 Last peak
PK2 Current peak
Θ1c Lateral Control
Θ1s Longitudinal Control
Acronyms
ACAH Attitude Command Attitude HoldADS Aeronautical Design StandardARISTOTEL Aircraft and Rotorcraft Pilot Coupling: Toolsand Techniques for Alleviation and DetectionA/RPC Aircraft/Rotorcraft Pilot CouplingDVE Degraded Visual EnvironmentFBW Fly-by-wireFCS Flight Control SystemHQ Handling QualitiesMTE Mission Task ElementNDI Nonlinear Dynamic InversePAC Phase Aggression CriterionPIO Pilot Induced OscillationPVS Pilot Vehicle SystemRC Rate CommandRLE Rate Limiting ElementROVER Real-Time Oscillation VeriﬁerSCAS Stability and Control Augmentation System
1. INTRODUCTION
Aircraft/Rotorcraft Pilot Couplings (A/RPCs*) havebecome very different and far more complex andvaried from those encountered in the past 1. Gener-ally, A/RPCs are deﬁned as “inadvertent, sustainedaircraft oscillations which are a consequence of anabnormal joint enterprise between the aircraft andthe pilot”2,3. In other words, they are undesirableand hazardous phenomena that are associatedwithpilot-aircraft interactions. It seems that there is aserious problem of safety regarding unpredictableA/RPC, especially in future large/ﬂexible aircraft,high speed civil transport and highly-augmentedrotorcraft, therefore also involving Handling Quali-
*In the paper both terms of A/RPC and PIO will be used asterminology
ties studies4,5. At the moment, we do not possessthe proper tools to prevent, detect, and alleviateA/RPCs, especially in future vehicle conﬁgurations6.Clearly, there is room for improvement in this area.At the end of 2016, a research activity waslaunched in the European Union under the um-brella of the Marie Skłodowska-Curie Joint Doctor-ates Programme âĂŞ Network for Innovative Train-ing on Rotorcraft Safety (NITROS) project (https://
www.nitros-ejd.org/). Bringing together a num-ber of research centres and universities in Europe,NITROS is focused on rotorcraft safety, preparinga new generation of talented young engineers, todoctoral level, to become future specialists in rotor-craft safety issues. One of the areas that need re-focus and better tools relates to RPCs. NITROS ad-dresses two main questions on RPCs:
1 How can one better predict embedded ten-dencies that predispose the pilot-aircraft sys-tem towards RPC occurrences in modern air-craft equipped with a partial or total ﬂy-by-wireﬂight control system (FCS)?
2 How can one better detect in real time embed-ded tendencies to RPCs in modern aircraft?
For the ﬁrst question, the goal is to concentrate onﬂight regimes where cliff-like phenomena are mostlikely to appear. For example, “high gain” trackingtasks where the non-linear rotorcraft dynamics playan important part in the FCS design as well as ef-fects of FCS mode transitions on handling qualitiescan be used as cases for embedded RPCs of mod-ern aircraft. The paper will give an example of a casewhere a Category III non-linear Pilot-Induced Oscil-lations (PIO) – i.e. PIO associated with non-linearﬂight control system effects – is triggered, determin-ing how these nonlinearities change with differentfactors, e.g. pilot input bandwidth or the amountof rate limiting experienced, and the consequencesherein on the RPC. The most signiﬁcant nonlineari-ties considered in terms of PIO in this paper will re-late to rate limits and saturations that occur natu-rally on control actuators, but AFCS-induced satura-tions can be considered as well.For the second question, the initial goal will beto build on the work of Ref.7 to assess the eﬃcacyof the Phase-Aggression Criterion (PAC) either: as ameans of alerting the pilot to conditions likely tolead to the onset of a PIO; or, given that the timeavailable to do this may be extremely limited, as ameans to assist the pilot in alleviating the PIO condi-tion itself. Initial results from ﬂight simulation trialsto explore how best to achieve this will be reported.PAC has so far been developed for rate commandsystems in the pitch and roll axes for command
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paths with time delays in them and in the roll axisfor command paths with rate limiting included. Thepaper will report on the development of PAC bound-aries for more highly augmented response types.
Figure 1: Heliﬂight-R, inside and outside views
1.1. Research goal
The research goal is to extend and improve ex-isting procedures used to predict Category III air-craft/rotorcraft pilot couplings (A/RPC) and giveguidelines to the designer how the automatic ﬂightcontrol system (AFCS) can be adjusted to minimiseA/RPCs. For modern aircraft equipped with a par-tial or total ﬂy-by-wire ﬂight control system (FCS),it is important to understand the effects of nonlin-ear ﬂight control systems and their role in trigger-ing Cat. III A/RPC, in combination with the inﬂuenceof the nonlinearity in the helicopter itself, such asthe actuator dynamics. As the level of automation islikely to increase and full-authority Fly-By-Wire sys-tems are likely to be more commonplace in opera-tional rotorcraft (at present operational on the NH-90, V-22 and BA609, but in the future probably alsoin commercial rotorcraft that hitherto have reliedon manual control), it follows that more Cat III RPCsare expected in the future.This paper is structured as follows. First, after in-troducing the subject of the research and the re-search goal, a description and insight about PIOswill be reported. Afterwards, the method on whichthe research is based is introduced. Then, the re-sults are reported and in the end, an overall dis-cussion on this study is held, conclusions are drawnand a future planning is proposed.
2. BACKGROUND AND INSIGHT
2.1. General Characteristics of PIO
Reference8 described 10 different kinds of deﬁni-tion for a PIO. The most classic deﬁnition belongsto McRuer "PIO is a sustained or uncontrollable un-intentional oscillation resulting from the efforts ofthe pilot to control the aircraft." Its ultimate ten-dency may be either constant-amplitude, conver-gent or divergent with time. PIO may contain anynumber of cycle of oscillations and there is no min-imum number to declare it a PIO. PIO may occur ata certain range (1 rad/s to 8 rad/s), but frequencyalone cannot determine whether an oscillation is aPIO or not. Furthermore, amplitude of the aircraftresponse state is another important factor to de-termine whether an oscillation is a PIO. Sometimessmall-amplitude oscillations may be regarded as a"mild" form of PIO and may not even be judged asPIO. Another way to judge the severity of PIO is bylooking at the extent of completion of the task. PIOthat interferes with, but does not prevent, perfor-mance of a primary ﬂying mission task is a "mod-erate" PIO. PIO that prevents performance of thetask, or that requires the pilot making an attemptto abandon the task to stop the oscillations, is a "se-vere" PIO.
2.2. PAC Background
The aim of the Phase-Aggression Criterion (PAC) isto predict and detect in real-time adverse rotorcraft-pilot couplings (ARPC). Up to now it has been devel-oped as a post-processing tool, i.e. processing dataresulting from simulated ﬂight trials to observe po-tential RPC susceptibility. Furthermore, apart fromoff-line detection, PAC has been developed to pre-dict PIO events (always during off-line simulation);the next step is to detect "on-line". It may simply bethat detecting and indicating to the pilot a PIO ten-dency is eﬃciently enough to alleviate it, but it maybe that, upon detecting, the control system needsto intervene to reduce the oscillations and keep thepilot workload at a reasonable level.PAC calculates time varying parameters, such asPhase Distortion (Φ) and Aggression (AG), based ondata traces related to pilot input (lateral and longi-tudinal stick deﬂection) and vehicle output (roll andpitch rate). PAC returns metrics that can be trans-lated into PIO or RPC susceptibility.The reason why we need a real-time metric isbecause sometimes pilots do not recognize sus-tained PIOs, and real-time detection can be used tomonitor the pilot-vehicle system (PVS) during criticalﬂight test evaluations.
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After a number of simulated test campaigns per-formed at the University of Liverpool9,10, differentPAC charts have been produced, for different con-trol axes (longitudinal and lateral) and for differentPIO categories (PIO Cat. I and Cat. II types), alongwith the reproduction of the PIO severity bound-aries deﬁned from a combination of subjective andobjective evaluations 11. Therefore, the PIO incipi-ence was engineered for a number of tasks, essen-tially: pitch tracking (with time delays and rate lim-iting elements), precision hover (with only time de-lays) and roll step.
2.3. Description of Cat. III PIO
Cat. III PIO are essentially nonlinear Pilot-VehicleSystem Oscillations related to transitions 12. ThesePIOs fundamentally depend on nonlinear transi-tions in either the effective controlled element dy-namics, or in the pilot’s behavioral dynamics 12:
– The shifts in effective controlled element dy-namics may be associated with the magni-tude of the pilot’s output, or may be due tointernal changes in either control system oraerodynamic/propulsion conﬁgurations, modechanges, etc. 12.
– Pilot transitions may be shifts in dynamic be-havioral properties (e.g., from compensatoryto synchronous), from modiﬁcations in cues(e.g., from attitude to load factor), or frombehavioral adjustments to accommodate taskmodiﬁcations 12.
Essentially, changes in controlled element dy-namics and pilot dynamic behavioural propertiesare not isolated but interconnected. Pilot transitionsmay appear after shifts in effective controlled ele-ment dynamics occur. For example, in normal cir-cumstances, when the vehicle mode changes, thepilot control pattern (e.g., from compensatory tosynchronous) and cues (e.g., from attitude to loadfactor) and pilot control strategy may also changeaccordingly. However, if there is a mismatch be-tween the pilot transition and controlled elementdynamics transition, the probability that Cat. III PIOwill occur is increased. Due to the nonlinearities andthe fact that dynamics or tasks change, A/RPC oc-currences in this category are most diﬃcult to ana-lyze oﬄine. Criteria speciﬁcally designed for this cat-egory are practically non-existent 12. It is the goal ofthis research project to design criteria for Cat III PIOspecially at rotorcraft.
2.4. Factors contributing to Cat III PIO
The focus of Cat III PIO relates to transitions in ef-fective controlled element dynamics, pilot transitionand mismatch between their transitions. Therefore,factors contributing to Cat. III PIO can be analysedfrom the following two aspects:
A Pilot-centered transitionsPilot-centered transitions can include: shiftsin cues (e.g., from attitude tracking to load-factor); shifts in behavioral mode (e.g., frompursuit to compensatory, or precognitive topursuit to compensatory); and shifts in ef-fective pilot equalization dynamics (e.g., fromcompensatory to synchronous or pure gain).Past experience indicates that the most sig-niﬁcant are the shifts from compensatory topure gain and, perhaps, the shifts in cues fromattitude to load-factor. Such shifts have beenfound to be especially important for ﬁxed-wingaircraft and involve ﬂexible modes and neu-romuscular couplings (e.g., limb-bobweight ef-fects) 12.
B Vehicle-centered transitionsFor ﬁxed-wing aircraft, the transitions in effec-tive controlled element dynamics can include:sudden changes in thrust, ﬂap settings, storesrelease, ﬂight control system modes, etc., orthe rapid but somewhat less sudden changessuch as increased mass introduced by refu-elling mission, drastic trim changes in suddendecelerations, etc., can cause major changesin the effective controlled element dynam-ics. These can create great challenges for pi-lot adaptive behavior especially when they oc-cur suddenly. These kinds of transitions in ef-fective controlled-element dynamics have be-come more prevalent since advances in ﬂightcontrol system technology have made possi-ble new modes designed on purpose help toimprove overall performance 13. Moreover, un-predictable failures of the aircraft systems (en-gine, control system, hydraulic system, actua-tor system, sensor system etc.) lead to sharpaircraft disturbance and/or the modiﬁcation ofaircraft handling qualities (e.g. dynamic charac-teristics, control sensitivity, feel system charac-teristics etc.). They cause changes in the effec-tive vehicle dynamics which lead to amismatchbetween the pilot control strategy and the air-craft dynamics 1.
For rotorcraft with ﬂy-by-wire FBW and digital con-trol, there have been RPC occurrences when thecommand type switched from attitude command to
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rate command in a Weight-on-Wheels situation 14,15.The same situation happened for the ﬁxed wing F-8 DFBW (Digital Fly-By-Wire) test aircraft3. The YF-22APC case and the XV-15 and later V-22 divergent lat-eral oscillations on the landing gear during groundtaxi operations (ﬁrst one predicted only on paper,the later encountered during ﬂight test program)can be included in this category 16.
2.5. Factors contributing to Cat III PIO atrotorcraft
The main factor contributing to Cat III PIO in ro-torcraft is the inherent delay between pilot inputand the rotorcraft body response. The higher or-der dynamics of rotorcraft, compared to ﬁxed wingaircraft, gives rise to delays of up to 100ms forconventional controlled rotorcraft and up to 250msfor rotorcraft augmented with FBW AFCS 17,18. Thisinput-response delay is built up from several com-ponents: rotor response delay due to ﬂapping dy-namics, actuator delay, digital signal processing andﬁltering delays.The result of this delay is a reduced bandwidthand a reduced phase margin which can lead to poorhandling qualities, which is why the US Army’s ro-torcraft handling Qualities Requirements Standard,ADS-33D5, consideres bandwidth and effective timedelay as two of themost important ﬂight control de-sign parameters.
3. METHOD
3.1. Pilot-Vehicle System Model
The incipience of PIOs is something diﬃcult to pre-dict and it is also really diﬃcult to understand whatis the cause behind them. It is without a doubtdoubtlessly strongly related to the Pilot-Vehicle Sys-tem, and essentially to the interactions betweenpilot and vehicle. Historically it has been demon-strated that the main causes triggering a PIO arethe amplitude of the pilot control inputs during thecompletion of a task, the phase delay between pi-lot input and aircraft response, and the frequencyat which these oscillatory phenomena occur.Figure 2, shows a block diagram representing aclosed-loop manual control task. Manual controltasks are usually designed to control a single axis(roll degree of freedom in this example), hence onlyone speciﬁc plane (here lateral), along with its vari-ables, is considered. It is clear how the (human) con-troller and the aircraft dynamics have key roles inthe successful completion of the task.In this example, the variables in question are thesystem input (trim bank angle) φtrim, the lateral pilot
control input δΘ1c , the lateral swashplate deﬂection
Θ1c and the system output (actual bank angle) φ.
3.2. PAC Overview
The Phase-Aggression Criterion7,9,10,11,19 originatesfrom the usefulness of other methods for obser-vation and detection of RPCs, such as the Pilot-Inceptor Workload proposed by Grey20,21 and theReal-Time Oscillation VERiﬁer (ROVER) developed byMitchell22. The novelty of the PAC with respect tothe previous methods resides in the fact that it pro-vides an indication of the severity of the PIO eventand can be used, by means of an in-cockpit device,as a warning system.Figure 3 shows an example of the time history oftwo signals representing the pilot input and the ro-torcraft response.
Figure 3: Time history of input-output signals for the de-termination of time peaks in order to calculate PAC pa-rameters
Considering motion in the lateral axis, the PhaseDistortion (Φ) parameter, introduced in the previ-ous chapter, can be calculated as shown in Equa-tion (1).
(1) Φ= 360 · TpPK2−TδPK2
TδPK2−TδPK1
Φ is basically given by the fraction of the differ-ence between the current time peaks of vehicle rateresponse and pilot input and the corresponding pe-riod of one oscillation of the pilot input, everythingmultiplied by 360 degrees. The Phase Distortion isan indication of the amount of phase delay betweenpilot input and aircraft response (e.g. a Φ of 90 degmeans aircraft response out of phase with respectto the pilot input). Each time a new Φ is calculated,an associated AG can be computed. Aggression (AG)can be considered as a measure of pilot controlactivity, i.e. how intensively the pilot is working to
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Figure 2: Schematic representation of a closed-loop manual control task in the roll axis
achieve precision in his/her task. In other words, thehigher the AG, the larger and faster the control in-puts. The algebraic deﬁnition of AG (in the roll axis)is presented in Equation (2) and shows that it is ba-sically the integral of the pilot control rate over thesampling time period, divided by the time period ofthe oscillatory cycle (i.e. the temporal integral meanof the pilot control rate over the sampling time pe-riod) and multiplied by Hs.
(2) AG = Hs · 1TpPK2−TpPK1 ·
∫ TpPK2
TpPK1
|δ˙θ1c(t)|dt
The term Hs represents the so-called controlgearing and describes the vehicle attitude rate withrespect to the pilot control input. In the previous re-searchHs was used for Rate Command (RC) systemsand its deﬁnition is given by Equation (3)
(3) Hs = ∆p∆δθ1c =
θ1c
∆δθ1c
· ∆p
θ1c
For a RC system the units of AG are deg/s2 sincethe units of Hs are deg/(s · in). However, the con-trol gearing term was introduced to make the cri-terion applicable to vehicles exhibiting different dy-namic response types. Therefore, for an AttitudeCommand Attitude Hold (ACAH) system the units of
AG will be deg/in and for a Translational Rate Com-mand (TRC) system the units will be m/in.From the input signal and output response, boththe Phase Distortion Φ and the Aggression AG pa-rameters can be calculated. Both Φ and AG canbe computed with respect to time, allowing for ob-servation of conditions where PIO incipience exists.However, each parameter calculation is related toa particular point in time, therefore each point canalso be associated with the known frequency at thatspeciﬁc time. Hence, it is also possible to observethe PIO tendencies with respect to frequency otherthan with respect to time.These two time-dependent, linked parameterscan be plotted on a chart analogous to Gray’s Duty
Cycle - Aggression chart20,21, but now called thePhase - Aggression chart. The PAC Chart representsa two-dimensional graph given by the results of thecomputation of the two parameters Φ and AG.Throughout a number of piloted simulation testcampaigns (conducted in different closed-loopMTEs), it was possible to isolate regions character-izing the severity of PIO events, hence identifying’No’, ’Moderate’ and ’Severe’ regions of the chart inrelation to the likelihood of PIO encounters. Differ-ent charts were produced, for different control axes(longitudinal and lateral), and for PIO Category I andII. Figure 4, for instance, represents the PAC chartfor the longitudinal plane, both for Category I andCategory II PIO type.
Figure 4: PAC Chart for the longitudinal plane, Category Iand II PIOs
It can be easily noted that PIO situations occurwhen high AG and high Φ are detected. A PhaseDistortion of 90 deg between pilot input and vehi-cle output rate represents traditional instability, i.e.pilot input 180 deg out of phase with respect to thevehicle attitude output. Category I oscillations de-scribe those cases where the PVS characteristics areessentially linear, i.e. situations where aircraft andpilot dynamics do not change during PIO events.Category II PIOs are characterized by a quasi-linearPVS with some non-linear contribution, such as rateor position limiters.
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3.3. PAC Assessment as an in-Cockpit WarningSystem
One of the challenges that part of this work ismeantto address is to understand whether a cockpit warn-ing system, giving indications about the PIO incipi-ence to the pilot, can be useful and based on theoutcome of this aspect, to what extent automationcan help the pilot in his/her task and reduce theworkload. PAC was developed for Cat. I/II PIO de-tection off-line and now the idea is to assess it inreal-time with an in-cockpit warning system. One ofthe devices that can be linked to the PAC and thenimplemented in an aircraft is a traﬃc light - style de-vice, which can give indication of the severity of thePIO events, transitioning from green to amber, andfrom amber to red if the PVS is encountering, re-spectively, moderate or severe PIOs. After runninga number of simulated ﬂight trials with a test pi-lot inside the HeliFlight-R Motion Simulator at theUniversity of Liverpool, he has been asked whether,during completion of a complex mission composedby different MTEs requiring high concentration anda certain amount of workload, the presence of a de-vice detecting PIOs in real-time in the cockpit andalerting him about the presence and severity of aPIO eventmay be appreciated or not. Consequently,he was also asked whether he would rather preferan automatic intervention. The answer was:"I have no issues with automation, I use automationa lot and we teach new pilots how to appropriately useautomation. As a pilot what I don’t want is a systemthat automatically prevents me from doing what I needto do in a speciﬁc moment. Therefore, a traﬃc light sys-tem showing when the boundaries to enter the moder-ate or severe PIO areas are crossed may be useful, but,if an automatic system had also to be present, I wantto have the freedom to override the system and say "Iam doing this, because I see with my eyes what is re-ally going on". So, especially in manoeuvres where thepilot is required to perform high gains, isn’t the auto-matic system impeding the pilot from doing what maybe necessary to do? Wouldn’t this be the equivalent ofintroducing a phase delay or a control limitation? Soit is a tough question which I can’t give you a straightanswer to. Personally, I would like the system to tell meif there is a problem, but I want to take the decision, es-pecially in critical situations. And if I am working reallyhard, then it comes down to what you are telling meand how you are going to tell me that I need to backoff and do something different "Therefore, the point is that an automated systemcan be useful, but in a manoeuvre where high pi-lot control activity is required, the system may pre-vent the pilot from doing what he wants, impedingthe pilot from achieving the goal of a mission. In the
end the pilot would always want to be able to over-ride and take control of the aircraft because he/sheis the only one perceiving with his/her sensory sys-tem what is happening in reality. Hence, there mustbe a higher level mechanism evaluating whether the"system is wrong" and allowing the pilot to take con-trol.Another important aspect to consider is to under-stand, for Cat. I/II PIOs, to what extent the cockpitwarning system can be useful in terms of pilot reac-tion time to the alert. In other words, the transitionbetween green, amber and red will take a certainamount of time, what needs to be assessed is if thisamount of time is suﬃcient or not to allow the pilotto react. Hence, the challenge will be to evaluate thecompatibility of the cockpit warning system’s transi-tion time with the fact that an automatic takeover isundesirable when in diﬃcult situations. If the tran-sition time is too small for a human pilot to reactthen the issue is even more challenging and hard tosolve.
3.4. Example of Characteristics for judging Cat.III PIO
There is no generalized effective criteria for detect-ing Cat. III PIO, thus one can qualitatively make anelementary judgment on whether the oscillation isa PIO from the following three characteristics of air-craft response states: amplitude (small, large), os-cillation frequency (quick, slow), ultimate tendency(convergent, divergent). The combination used forjudging is listed in Table 1.The small amplitude and convergent tendency ofthe response state guarantees the safety of the air-craft. As for the oscillation frequency, it affects thepilot behavior, the higher the frequency, the harderit is for the pilot to take corrective actions to restorethe aircraft from the PIO. For combination 1 and 2 inTable 1, the pilot may not need to do the correctiveaction, thus it can be regarded as no PIO althoughthere are oscillations. For combination 3 and 4, thedivergent tendency will make the aircraft unsafe butsince the amplitude is small, if the oscillation fre-quency is slow, then it is possible for the pilot to docorrective action to recover from PIO, thus combi-nation 3 can be regarded as moderate while com-bination 4 is moderate to severe. For combination5 and 6, large amplitude during the ﬂying task is apotential dangerous factor because the response ofthe aircraft may exceed its safe range. Even if theultimate tendency is convergent it may also causea moderate to severe PIO. The same analysis alsoapplies to combination 7 and 8.
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Table 1: Characteristics for judging PIO
Combination Amplitude Oscillation frequency Ultimate tendency Safety PIO1 Small Quick Convergent Safe No2 Small Slow Convergent Safe No3 Small Slow Divergent Unsafe Moderate4 Small Quick Divergent Unsafe Moderate/Severe5 Large Quick Convergent Unsafe Moderate/Severe6 Large Slow Convergent Unsafe Moderate/Severe7 Large Slow Divergent Unsafe Moderate/Severe8 Large Quick Divergent Unsafe Severe
3.5. A Simple Analysis for understanding Cat IIIPIO – Build a simple simulation model
In order to get some physical feeling about Cat IIIPIO in helicopters, a simple model is used as ex-ample, i.e. a 3-DOF nonlinear longitudinal model in-volving surge, heave and pitch (u,w,q) as DOF. Asthe model is just related to longitudinal motion, thetask in this paper is set to be a speed manoeuver:accelerating from hover to a constant speed, whilekeeping the altitude constant. The key responsestates of the helicopter are forward speed, pitch an-gle and altitude (V,θ,H). It is assumed that if thepitch angle exceeds its normal range, there is a po-tential for instability. Forward speed and altitudeare used for judging the extent of completion of thetask. As for the pilot model, according to McRuer3,it is known that in analysing the PIO, the pilot modelcan be reduced to a simple gain, and consideringthe pilotâĂŹs operation delay, the pilot model in thispaper is expressed as a simple gain with pure timedelay: Kp · e−τpTo this model a stability and command augmen-tation system (SCAS) model has been built for sta-bilization. The SCAS used in this paper is designedbased on PID controllers. The pilot and SCAS in-puts are added to generate the input to the actu-ator. In addition, the most signiﬁcant nonlinearitiesin a given FCSmode are command gain shaping andrate limit and position saturation 12, thus the wholesimulation model is built up as represented in Fig-ure 5.The percentage of the position of the cyclic andcollective joystick to represent the pilot input is inthe range [-50%, 50%]. The proposed commandgain shaping of the pilot input is shown in Figure6. Furthermore, it is assumed that the sensors areideal, namely their transfer function is "1". The struc-ture of the actuator dynamics is shown in Figure 7,where K is set as 20, and its reciprocal value repre-sents the time constant of the actuator23. The inputdata of the 3-dof model represent the BO-105 he-licopter, and the control range of its cyclic controland collective control being θc ∈ [−10,5.5] deg and
θ0 ∈ [2,18] deg respectively24.
4. RESULTS
4.1. Simulation Performed
The top half of Figure 5 shows the vehicle triggersthat may result in PIO. To study the inﬂuence ofsome of these vehicle triggers on PIOs, one ﬁrst hasto set a baseline scenario. The baseline scenario isan ideal case without actuator rate limit, no sen-sor dynamics, and also an ideal pilot model withouttime delay. Due to the safety and reliability problemof a full authority SCAS, in the baseline scenario, apartial authority SCAS is used to help control andstabilize the helicopter and the control authority is30%. Then, the vehicle triggers are varied (e.g. timedelay of helicopter main body, actuator rate limit,actuator position saturation, SCAS control author-ity) in order to see their inﬂuence in triggering PIO.The results of the baseline scenario (case 1) andother cases are listed in Table2.Case 1, 2, 3 and case 5, 6, 7, 8 are performedfor studying the inﬂuence of the pilot time delayin triggering PIO. Case 1, 4 and case 5, 9 are usedfor studying the inﬂuence of the helicopter time de-lay in triggering PIO. Cases 5, 10, 11, 12, 13 are imple-mented for studying the inﬂuence of the SCAS con-trol authority on PIO triggering. Actually, the varia-tion in SCAS control authority can be considered asan AFCS-induced saturation, which can also be re-garded as a failure of SCAS. Case 14, 15, 16 is per-formed for researching the inﬂuence of actuator po-sition saturation in triggering PIO. It can be regardedas a failure of actuator with the decrease of the ma-nipulate range. Case 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23 are casesrelated to the inﬂuence of actuator rate limit in trig-gering PIO. Reduction of actuator rate limit can beconsidered as a kind of actuator failure. Failures ofSCAS and actuator are therefore transitions in ef-fective controlled vehicle dynamics. Concluding, thePIOs induced in this paper are including decreaseof control authority of SCAS, actuator position sat-
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Figure 5: Simulation model with SCAS for BO 105
Figure 6: Command gain shaping of pilot input
Figure 7: Actuator dynamics
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Table 2: Speed maneuver results for BO105 accelerating from hover condition (0.1m/s).
Actuator saturationCase SCAS Kp τp τb θc θ0 Rate limit Reference Time domain results PIOlimit (s) (s) (deg) (deg) (deg/s) velocity (m/s)1 Baseline? 30% 1 0 0 [-10, 5.5] [2, 18] no 0.1 No oscillation No2 30% 1 1.5 0 [-10, 5.5] [2, 18] no 0.1 Small slow convergent No3 30% 1 2 0 [-10, 5.5] [2, 18] no 0.1 Small slow divergent Moderate4 30% 1 0 0.1 [-10, 5.5] [2, 18] no 0.1 Small quick divergent Moderate/Severe5 30% 1 0 0 [-10, 5.5] [2, 18] no 10 No oscillation No6 30% 1 1.5 0 [-10, 5.5] [2, 18] no 10 No oscillation No7 30% 1 2 0 [-10, 5.5] [2, 18] no 10 Small slow divergent Moderate8 30% 3 0.5 0 [-10, 5.5] [2, 18] no 10 Large quick convergent Moderate9 30% 1 0 0.1 [-10, 5.5] [2, 18] no 10 No oscillation No10 15% 1 0 0 [-10, 5.5] [2, 18] no 10 No oscillation No11 10% 1 0 0 [-10, 5.5] [2, 18] no 10 Large quick convergent Moderate/Severe12 5% 1 0 0 [-10, 5.5] [2, 18] no 10 Large quick divergent Severe13 0% 1 0 0 [-10, 5.5] [2, 18] no 10 Large quick divergent Severe14 30% 1 0 0 [-10, 5.5] [2, 18] no 20 No oscillation No15 30% 1 0 0 [-6.15, 1.65] [6, 14] no 20 Small slow convergent No16 30% 1 0 0 [-4.25, -0.25] [8, 12] no 20 Large quick divergent Severe17 30% 1 0 0 [-10, 5.5] [2, 18] 60 30 Small quick convergent No18 30% 1 0 0 [-10, 5.5] [2, 18] 30 30 Small quick divergent Moderate/Severe19 30% 1 0 0 [-10, 5.5] [2, 18] 10 30 Large quick divergent Severe20 30% 1/3 0 0 [-10, 5.5] [2, 18] 10 30 Small quick convergent No/Slight21 30% 1 0 0 [-10, 5.5] [2, 18] 10 20 No oscillation No22 30% 1/3 0 0 [-10, 5.5] [2, 18] 2 30 Small quick convergent No/Slight23 30% 1 0 0 [-10, 5.5] [2, 18] 2 10-20-30 Small quick convergent-no-no No-No-No24 30% 1 0 0 [-10, 5.5] [2, 18] no 20-30-40 No-No-Large quick divergent No-No-Severe25 100% 1 0 0 [-10, 5.5] [2, 18] no 20-30-40 No-No-No No-No-No26 30% 1/3 0 0 [-10, 5.5] [2, 18] no 20-30-40 No-No-No No-No-No
uration and actuator rate limit, and therefore theybelong to Cat. III PIO. Case 24 and 25 relate to thecomparison between partial and full authority ﬂy-by-wire ﬂight control system.
4.2. Analysis of Results
Using Table1 to interpret the simulation results, the25 above-given scenarios listed in Table2 result infollowing PIOs:
• The pilot vehicle system (PVS) is not very sen-sitive to time delay of the pilot, the SCAS help-ing to control and stabilize the helicopter andweakening the adverse effects of pilot time de-lay on the system. This conclusion is only truewhen assuming that there is no time delay in-troduced by the SCAS. Time delay introduced inthe helicopter response has greater inﬂuencein triggering PIO than time delay of pilot does(case1 to case 4);
• Maintaining the hover condition is more diﬃ-cult when introducing pilot or helicopter timedelays and more prone to PIO and this de-pends on the velocity imposed in the speedmaneuver (comparison between cases 2 to 4and cases 6,7,9). This means that the effects of
time delay are related to the performed ﬂyingtask;
• With the increase in the pilot gain, the PVS willbe PIO prone for a smaller time delay (case 6and 8), which means that, if the time delay ofthe PVS is large, the pilot should manipulatemore softly the controls in order to avoid PIO;
• With the decrease of the SCAS control author-ity, the PVS becomes increasingly prone to PIO(case 5, 10 to 13);
• Narrowing the control range of the actuator(the actuator being easier to saturate), the PVSbecomes more PIO prone (case 14 to case 16);
• With the decrease of the rate limit value of theactuator, the PVS becomes increasingly proneto PIO (case 17 to case 19);
• Decreasing the pilot gain can help prevent thePVS from getting into PIO induced by the re-duction of rate limit of the actuator (case 17, 18,19, 20 and 22);
• Doing the velocity maneuver step by step (i.e.changing the reference velocity in steps) can
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also help the PVS to not get into PIO (case 19and 23);
• With the same saturation limit of the actuatorposition, SCAS with full authority can accom-plish certain ﬂying tasks free from PIO whilethe SCAS with partial authority result in trigger-ing PIOs (case 24 and 25);
• Decreasing the pilot gain can contribute to pre-venting the PVS from falling into PIO triggeredby the decrease of the control authority of theSCAS (case 24, 25 and 26).
Decreasing the pilot gain can be regarded as a tran-sition of pilot control strategy. The ﬂying tasks ofCase 21 and 19 are different, and it can be viewedas a kind of task transition. From the results of cases19, 20 and 21, one can conclude that the pilot controlstrategy should change in time while performing atask, otherwise there may be a mismatch betweenthe pilot control strategy and the ﬂying task. Thiskind of mismatch is a reason for triggering Cat. IIIPIO. The mismatch between transitions in effectivecontrolled vehicle dynamics and pilot control strat-egy will result in Cat.III PIO, which is demonstratedby case 24, 25 and 26.
5. CONCLUSIONS
For modern aircraft equipped with a partial or totalﬂy-by-wire ﬂight control system, control authority ofthe SCAS is an important factor in triggering Cat. IIIPIO. This is due to the fact that variation of controlauthority can be regarded as a kind of transition ofeffective controlled vehicle dynamics. Although PIOcaused by actuator position saturation and actua-tor rate limit are usually classiﬁed as Cat. II PIO, onecan also consider PIO caused by these two factorsas Cat. III as the variation of actuator position sat-uration and actuator rate limit can be consideredas well as a transition of effective controlled vehicledynamics . These factors belong to a mismatch be-tween transitions in effective controlled vehicle dy-namics and pilot control strategy. Furthermore, PIOis related to task transitions, and a mismatch be-tween the pilot control strategy and the ﬂying taskcan lead to Cat. III PIO.
5.1Way Forward
In this paper, some factors triggering Cat. III PIOwere analysed. The analysis shown in this paper issimple but can help to a fundamental understand-ing of Cat. III PIO deﬁnition. In the future the anal-ysis will be extended to include more factors that
may lead to Cat. III PIO, such as sensor dynamics,inceptor dynamics and multi-mode transitions ofﬂight control system. For multi-mode transitions ofﬂight control system in triggering Cat. III PIO, differ-ent control modes will be designed in the ﬂight con-trol system (FCS) (e.g. RCAH, ACAH, TRC, PH) meet-ing the ADS-33 speciﬁcation basic FCS modes de-scription5. The pilot will control the vehicle manu-ally based on these response types in order to ac-complish a designed ﬂying task with multi-modetransitions switched on automatically during theﬂight. Then, a more robust SCAS system will be alsodesigned based on advanced control theory (e.g.NDI, INDI method25,26), the goal being to study itsfunction in preventing PIO. Last but not the least, ex-tending and improving existing criteria for predict-ing Cat. III PIO is urgent as well since at the presentlittle criteria can be used for detection and predic-tion of Cat. III PIO.
6. FUTURE PLANNING
6.1. Pilot Identiﬁcation
Aside from PAC development it would be of partic-ular importance to implement, within the NITROSproject and speciﬁcally in the research related toRPCs, some relevant ﬂight simulation aspects, suchas pilot identiﬁcation and cybernetic techniques tostudy pilotâĂŹs control behaviour with control pa-rameters estimation, similarly to some other workpreviously undertaken at the University of Liverpooland Delft University of Technology 19,27,28, relatingthe Phase Aggression Criterion to Pilot Identiﬁca-tion during Rotorcraft Pilot Couplings.Regarding pilot control behaviour study, it may beinteresting to understand how and when the pi-lot is changing control strategy and control be-haviour. Objective measurements of pilot changingbehaviour and adaptation29,30, through pilot iden-tiﬁcation techniques, can be useful to understandwhen the pilot is going to induce PIO events and po-tentially anticipate his/her triggering action.
6.2. Scalograms
Another avenue where PIO events may be investi-gated may be undertaken with the use of waveletscalogram-based metrics31. These metrics considerthe time-varying peak pilot input power as a func-tion of the controlled element phase at the fre-quency of the peak power, all of which are indica-tors of the PIO signature deﬁned by Mitchell22. InKlyde’s view, "Wavelet transform is a way to charac-terize time-varying systems, this is a powerful toolfor detecting changes in more transient or time
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varying pilot-vehicle systems including PIO scenar-ios, because the wavelet scalogram shows both thepeaks in power and when in time the sinusoid oc-curred"31. Moreover, according to Masarati, "TypicalPIOs are intrinsically time dependent and character-ized by intrinsic frequency aspects, therefore meth-ods capable of simultaneously capturing frequencyand time domain related aspects are desirable"32,and again "Wavelet transforms play an importantrole in the analysis of signals whose frequency con-tent is signiﬁcantly time-dependent and it is thoughtthat such approach can provide a formulation of in-dicators associated with the insurgence of adverseRPC events". The work performed in32 made use ofthe ROVER and PAC methods within a sound time-frequency approach, in order to exploit their capa-bility to link the energy in signals to both its fre-quency content and its position in time, in an at-tempt to identify those changes that may reveal theaction of a trigger. Further research is needed tomeet this goal.
6.3. Cockpit Warning System
Going forward with the research, as already men-tioned in the previous chapters, the next step willbe to improve the capabilities of PAC during detec-tion of PIO events either before or as they are occur-ring, with a cockpit warning system to provide thepilot with useful cueing of what is happening anddeveloping means of alleviating adverse RPC. To de-sign the alert system the PAC chart boundaries canbe used. Different ideas may be employed for thewarning system, such as:
• Traﬃc light - style device: green, amber, redﬂashing lights associated with the three re-gions of PIO severity. Green means "no PIO",amber means "moderate PIO", red means "se-vere PIO",
• Haptic device on the active inceptor systemalerting the pilot that some kind of instabilityis occurring. The aim is to lead the pilot to re-duce the aggression by means of a change instick force through a haptic device
• Sound: a noise of a certain intensity whencrossing the boundary of moderate/severe PIOevents
• Display design. A polygon indicating the rel-evant parameters along with their thresholds(for PIO incipience), similarly to the ROVERﬂags, directly showing to the pilot in quantita-tive terms the incipience of PIO events.
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